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At the end of 1941, the 1st Free French Brigade, transported by a mix of French, British and 
American-made vehicles, undertook the hazardous but eagerly anticipated journey from its 
base in the Levant to Egypt, to begin its service under British Middle East Command. The 
Free French were, in fact, joining a multi-national, multi-ethnic, British-led coalition 
composed of units from Britain, its colonies and self-governing dominions, and, since late 
1940, from its European allies – the governments-in-exile and national committees based in 
London and Cairo. Until now only a few of these small European exile units had actually 
been sent to the front, representing Britain’s first, tentative steps towards interallied 
cooperation in the desert war. In 1942 the British would increase their use of Allied forces, a 
move which would be replete with benefits but also challenges. Thus, five months after the 
Free French joined this coalition, the Axis forces in Libya attacked the British Eighth Army’s 
defensive positions known as the Gazala line. It was the French who held the southern anchor 
of this line at Bir Hakeim. Captain Edward Tomkins, a British liaison officer, was with them 
at this strategic position: ‘This is where the important part of the French action in Libya took 
place because… they established, thanks to all the [British] liaison team, proper connections, 
proper relations with… the neighbouring [British] units, and they formed a properly 
integrated part of the defensive system’.1 This was an unprecedented degree of Allied 
military cooperation, according to Tomkins, as previously foreign armies fighting in concert 
had ‘tended to be much more autonomous’. Comparing Bir Hakeim to the Allied campaign in 
France in 1940, he pointed out that in 1940 ‘there was the French army and the British army 
and they had their own structures and their own lines of communication, [whereas] on this 
occasion it was an integrated force.’2 Indeed, accounts from other liaison officers give the 
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impression that Franco-British cooperation and coordination in 1940 were so inadequate that 
it almost seems like the two allies were fighting separate wars.3 Returning to Tomkins, during 
the Axis siege of Bir Hakeim he was captured and came face to face with General Erwin 
Rommel. He subsequently spent a year in a prisoner-of-war camp in Italy, before escaping 
and walking for 81 days to reach Allied forces in southern Italy. The Free French were more 
fortunate, after a 15-day defence which earned admiration throughout Eighth Army, they 
succeeded in evacuating 72 per cent of their soldiers from the position on the night of 10-11 
June.4 
 
Tomkins’ testimony raises important questions about the British-led coalition campaign in 
the desert – a campaign which marked a milestone in the development of interallied 
cooperation since the debacle of 1940. How does the army of a leading Allied nation 
integrate foreign soldiers from minor allies, overcoming the differences of language, culture, 
training, equipment?  In the era before the North Atlantic military alliance, ensuring close 
cooperation between troops of different nationalities could be a complex task. Even when 
armies shared a common language and close ties, such as between the British and 
Commonwealth forces in North Africa, cooperation could sometimes be problematic, 
requiring a degree of learning and compromising from both sides.5 Similarly, the British-
American alliance, which chose North Africa for its first joint ground offensive in late 1942, 
was not devoid of serious disagreements over strategy and command, even if it was rightly 
described by General George Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, as ‘the most 
complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two Allied nations’.6  Therefore, 
when we come to allies who are not even familiar with each others’ languages and cultures, 
the scope for difficulties in interallied cooperation is magnified. Yet language was far from 
the most difficult obstacle. In the absence of a common doctrine, the British high command 
expected Allied units to follow British principles of organisation and operating procedures. 
This was unsurprising considering the relatively small Allied military contributions in 
comparison with the British war effort and the fact that Britain was hosting and equipping 
these Allied forces. However, it was also natural that imposing British norms on foreign 
soldiers accustomed to different standards could create interallied friction and resentment. 
Taking the Free French forces in the Libyan campaign as a case study, this article will 
examine the problems resulting from Allied units serving under British command and how 
they were resolved. In particular, it will focus on the work of the British military mission to 
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the Free French forces, known as the Spears Mission after its commander, General Edward 
Spears. The liaison officers of the Spears Mission represented French needs and problems to 
the British high command, while also having responsibility for ensuring that the French 
followed British procedures and orders. Managing Franco-British military relations was not 
an easy task and sometimes the Mission was the victim of both sides’ frustration. Yet, this 
article will show that despite setbacks, or perhaps because of them, interallied military 
cooperation gradually improved during the 1942 Libyan campaign, which saw the 
deployment under British command of two French brigades, a Polish brigade, a Greek 
brigade and a Czechoslovakian battalion (discussed in another article in this issue by Paul 
Lenormand). This episode was not unique; other theatres displayed similar learning curves in 
interallied cooperation. For example, the rushed recruitment of Polish and Czech pilots into 
the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the battle of Britain in the summer of 1940 posed problems 
of communication, training and tactics, yet their contribution to that victory was vital: no. 303 
Polish Fighter Squadron shot down three times the average RAF squadron score and incurred 
one third of the average casualties.7 Nonetheless, the desert war carries particular importance 
because it acted as a precursor for larger and even more multinational land campaigns in Italy 
and northwest Europe. 
 
Until recently, the historiography of the British war effort of 1939-45 has lacked research on 
the interlinked issues of the contribution of non-British forces and the work of interallied 
liaison. While historians have begun to grapple with the question of Britain’s reliance on its 
empire,8 there have been few studies of the contribution of European exile forces.9 Similarly, 
the historiography of the Free French forces is relatively undeveloped: historians of France 
during the Second World War have focused much more attention on the Vichy regime and 
the resistance within France than on the external resistance represented by the Free French 
movement. The few historians working on the Free French have tended to concentrate on the 
politics surrounding General Charles de Gaulle, his intelligence service or the motives and 
personal experiences of Free French soldiers.10 Recent work has also explored the 
movement’s international networks and activities in Free French territories.11  There has been 
even fewer studies of the participation of Free French forces in Allied campaigns before the 
movement’s merger with the formerly Vichy forces of French North Africa in 1943.12 The 
existing works on this subject have concentrated on battle narrative and are restricted to a 
purely French perspective since they have not examined military archives outside of France.13 
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This means that the practical questions of how Free French and other Allied units operated 
within a British-led army have been left unaddressed.  
 
An outline of Free French-British military cooperation, 1940-1943 
On 18 June 1940, two days after the new head of the French government Marshal Philippe 
Pétain announced that France would negotiate an armistice with Germany, General Charles 
de Gaulle, a French army officer, made an appeal to France from the BBC in London. He 
called on those French people who wanted to continue the war to join him in London. This 
was the beginning of the Free French forces. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister 
since 10 May 1940, gave vigorous support to de Gaulle’s project despite scepticism from 
other members of his war cabinet. Unlike his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and the Lord 
President of the Council (and recent Prime Minister), Neville Chamberlain, Churchill 
believed that the alliance with France was essential to Britain’s survival and eventual 
victory.14 Pétain agreed an armistice with Hitler on 22 June, whereby Germany would occupy 
northern and western France and Pétain’s government, based in Vichy, would control the 
remaining two-fifths of the country and its army would be limited to 100,000 men. 
Nevertheless, Churchill hoped that the French Empire would continue the war alongside 
Britain, especially French North Africa with its powerful armed forces. He was confident that 
de Gaulle was the man who could split the colonies from the metropole. Churchill’s 
enthusiasm was not shared by the chiefs-of-staff of the British armed forces. In July 1940, he 
dismissed their reservations about French reliability, reminding them: ‘It is the settled policy 
of His Majesty’s Government to make good strong French contingents for land, sea and air 
service’.15 Thus, British collaboration with de Gaulle took a definite shape with the signing of 
the agreement of 7 August 1940. In it the British committed to maintaining the French 
character of his force, to providing equipment and to lending money to finance it. De Gaulle 
was recognised as the supreme commander of this force but he agreed to follow directives 
from the British high command and that parts of his force could be put under British 
command.16 This agreement gave the Free French the status of ally rather than simply a 
foreign unit incorporated into the British forces. Around the same time, the British also made 
a military agreement with the Polish government-in-exile in London, similar agreements were 
to follow in 1941 with the Czechoslovak, Belgian, Dutch and Norwegian exile forces based 
in Britain. 
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Initially, de Gaulle seemed poised to fulfil Churchill’s expectations. By late September 1940 
several colonies had rallied to his cause, including the French islands in the Pacific, 
Cameroon and French Equatorial Africa (except Gabon, seized by Gaullists in November). 
The Free French forces now numbered about 12,200 personnel.17 Emboldened by this 
momentum, Churchill and de Gaulle dispatched a Franco-British expedition to Dakar to win 
over French West Africa. However, the operation failed, damaging Free French credibility. 
West Africa, North Africa and the rest of the Empire were unmoved by de Gaulle’s appeal, 
preferring to stay loyal to the Vichy government. Consequently, Free French recruitment 
rapidly declined and Churchill was greatly disappointed. Nonetheless, by the end of 1940 de 
Gaulle had a substantial territorial base from which he increased his military strength to 
35,000 soldiers.18 This put the Free French in a somewhat stronger position than most of 
Britain’s other allies: the Poles had about the same number of troops at this time but lacked 
the overseas territory and resources, the Dutch and Belgians on the other hand, possessed 
colonies but boasted much smaller armies.19 The Free French thus developed the perception 
of being an important ally to the British which was exacerbated by two factors. Firstly, until 
the shock defeat of June 1940 France had been considered a great power and de Gaulle 
proclaimed it his mission to restore this status and to zealously protect French national 
interests in the interim. Secondly, owing to the close collaboration that emerged between 
Churchill and de Gaulle during the summer of 1940 (and despite relations subsequently 
deteriorating), the latter had the habit of going directly to the Prime Minister when he had a 
disagreement with the British high command. This behaviour contrasted with the other allies 
who were usually constrained to go through the normal military and diplomatic channels. 
Both Free French and British senior officers were aware of this difference of status and were 
influenced by it. Having said that, de Gaulle’s autonomy as ‘supreme commander’ of the Free 
French forces was limited by the fact that he was entirely dependent on the British for 
equipment, logistics and financing and the British never involved him in decision-making 
about the strategic direction of the war.  
 
What follows is a short summary of the Free French forces’ involvement in Allied military 
campaigns, from the organisation’s modest beginnings in 1940 until its fusion with the 
formerly Vichy forces of French North Africa in 1943.20 Until 1942 the Free French 
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contribution was characterised by its small size or the short duration of its involvement 
(usually lasting one to three months). As a result of French soldiers rallying to the Free 
French cause in British-controlled Egypt, the 1st Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine (BIM) was 
formed in August 1940. It was composed of French colonial infantry who had been stationed 
in Cyprus and others who had escaped from the pro-Vichy forces of the Levant (the French 
mandates of Syria and Lebanon). Two companies from this unit were attached to the British 
7th Armoured Division and participated in the first British offensive against the Italian forces 
in Libya. They took part in the capture of the strategic port of Tobruk on 21 January 1941. 
Meanwhile, a small force commanded by General Phillippe Leclerc launched raids into 
southern Libya from Chad. Moreover, de Gaulle formed a Brigade Française d’Orient from 
the French troops who rallied to his side in Britain, mainly foreign legionnaires. The Brigade 
played a useful role in the British-led campaign to capture Italian East Africa from February 
to April 1941. After this victory the Brigade, the 1st BIM and newly raised infantry battalions 
from Equatorial Africa were assembled into a Free French division in Palestine. Alongside 
British, Australian, Indian and Czechoslovakian forces, the Free French invaded the pro-
Vichy Levant (8 June – 14 July 1941) and won a hard-fought victory over fellow Frenchmen 
– a victory made more costly by the fact that the British were unable to provide sufficient 
transport or artillery to their ally. On the plus side, the Free French took possession of all 
French war material in the Levant and gained 4,100 recruits from the defeated Vichy forces.21 
In the aftermath the Free French forces were reorganised and in January 1942, the 1st Free 
French Brigade began what became an eleven-month deployment with British forces in Egypt 
and Libya. During the battle of Gazala (26 May – 15 June 1942), the Brigade became the 
centre of media attention for its 15-day defence of Bir Hakeim against repeated Italo-German 
assaults. On the night of 10 June, the Brigade was evacuated from its encircled position. 
During the summer it was completely re-equipped by the British and in its next engagement, 
the second battle of El Alamein (23 October – 11 November 1942), it failed to hold the ridge 
of Himeimat under difficult conditions. The 2nd Free French Brigade joined Eighth Army in 
April 1942. The unit lacked equipment and was mostly composed of colonial troops from 
Equatorial Africa, which the British command did not rate highly. The 2nd Brigade also 
fought at El Alamein, attached to the 50th British Division. Both Brigades were withdrawn 
from Eighth Army in late 1942 to form ‘Force Larminat’ which later became the 1st Free 
French Division. In May 1943, the force joined Eighth Army in Tunisia for the last round of 
fighting before the surrender of the Axis forces in North Africa. General Leclerc’s column 
advancing through southern Libya also linked up with Eighth Army. By this stage the Vichy 
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garrison of French North Africa had joined the Allied camp, following the Allied landings in 
Morocco and Algeria in November 1942. After negotiations during the summer of 1943 
between de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud, commanding French North Africa, their 
respective forces began the difficult process of unifying into one army. 
 
The Free French join British Eighth Army: early problems  
Following the agreements signed between Britain and its European allies during 1940-1941, 
the War Office outlined to senior British officers the principles governing the organisation 
and employment of Allied forces which were serving with the British army in Britain, 
notably: ‘The organisation of Allied units is based generally on British War Establishments… 
Each Allied contingent will retain its own national character in respect of personnel, 
discipline, language, promotion and duties. Regimental colours, national distinctions of rank 
and badges may be retained… The Commander of each Allied contingent shall be 
responsible for the organisation, training, administration and discipline of his contingent.’22 
While this directive gave the impression that the idiosyncrasies of the Allied contingents 
would be respected, on active operations, such as in the Middle East where some Allied units 
were fighting with British Eighth Army, the reality was different.  
 
By autumn 1941 the bulk of the Free French land forces had been concentrated in the Levant 
and were eager to participate in the British campaign in Libya. General Georges Catroux, 
based in Beirut, was the commander-in-chief of Free French forces in the Middle East. Yet 
much of his time was taken up with governing the Levant. The driving force behind military 
policy was General Edgard de Larminat, who before the armistice had been the chief-of-staff 
of the French Middle East theatre of operations. When the Free French later joined British 
Eighth Army, he became the commander of a small headquarters staff, designated French 
Forces in the Western Desert. Under his command would fall General Pierre Koenig 
commanding the 1st Free French Brigade and General Alfred Cazaud, commanding the 2nd 
Brigade. Animated by the same independent spirit cultivated by de Gaulle, de Larminat often 
bypassed the Spears Mission and dealt directly with the various British headquarters and 
departments. Free French senior officers tended to distrust General Spears. He was a veteran 
of Franco-British military liaison from the Great War and had been a strong advocate of the 
Free French cause in 1940 but had fallen out with de Gaulle after the Free French-British 
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conquest of the Levant. Spears was suspected of trying to take advantage of French weakness 
in order to seize the Levant for Britain. For his part, Spears accused de Gaulle of prioritising 
the safeguarding of French national interests over the military goal of winning the war.23  
 
De Larminat and his staff had developed a distinctively French solution to the challenges of 
modern warfare which was to become a stumbling block to Free French participation in 
Eighth Army. Between August and September 1941, de Larminat had convened two meetings 
of all senior officers in the Levant to decide the future organisation and armaments of their 
units, based on the study of the lessons of the French defeat of 1940 and of subsequent 
campaigns involving the Free French forces. A consensus was reached that the Free French 
forces needed mobility and powerful anti-tank and anti-aircraft defences. The result was the 
1st Light Division which had far more firepower than a French heavy division of 1940.24 In 
negotiations over the deployment of a Free French force to Libya, British Middle East 
Command insisted that the Free French adapt the organisation of their ‘Light Divisions’ so 
that they corresponded to the nearest British equivalent, the Independent Brigade Group. The 
British believed the use of the word ‘division’ was motivated purely by political 
considerations, as in their opinion it was not justified by the small number of troops.25 
Therefore, to avoid confusion and difficulties both on and off the battlefield, the British 
wanted the Light Divisions designated, organised and equipped as British independent 
brigades. For General Koenig the Light Division title was justified, not by its troop strength 
but by its firepower which was far superior to that of an independent brigade, particularly in 
regard to the number of heavy anti-tank weapons. Nonetheless, the Free French made some 
last-minute adjustments to their organisation and accepted to be equipped according to the 
war establishment of an independent brigade. Unbeknownst to the Free French this was only 
the start of the British attempt to make the Free French units conform to British army norms. 
 
Before the 1st Free French Brigade’s deployment to Libya in early 1942, the British military 
authorities in Egypt agreed with Koenig a training programme in desert warfare for his 
officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO).26 In his memoirs Koenig, a veteran of the 
Levant campaign, claimed that some aspects of the British method of training Allied armies 
was condescending. In his opinion, the British instructors (in fact mostly New Zealanders) 
regarded the Free French as new arrivals in ‘their’ desert who needed to be guided by the 
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hand like a ‘child’. He admitted that the Free French needed to learn certain procedures that 
the British had perfected over two years of experience in the desert, such as navigation by 
day and night and tactical formation for bivouacs. However, according to Koenig, the British 
went further, giving lectures on the basics of soldiering, such as how to lead a patrol.27 He 
concluded that ‘our position as pupils… underlined with some cruelty the defeat of France 
and its diminishment.’28 Koenig’s memoirs are not an entirely reliable source, as shall be 
shown later, and no negative comments about the British instructors could be found in the 
accounts of several other Free French officers. Yet a British source does suggest that there 
was tension. A liaison officer attached to the 1st Brigade criticised the Free French attitude to 
training, claiming that few officers and no NCOs had sufficient competence in navigation: ‘If 
lectures and courses are given officers stand about and do not really work. This state of 
affairs will continue until the Army commander issues an order to the French forces stating 
that every officer must pass an examination and practical test in navigation. No requests and 
polite hints will have the slightest effect’.29 When the composition of the 1st Brigade is 
examined, a possible explanation emerges for why some Free French might have resented 
British training or simply found it uninteresting. There were five infantry battalions in the 
Brigade: four were battle-hardened and had experience of desert conditions. The two 
battalions from the Foreign Legion (and Koenig himself was from the Legion) were at home 
in the desert since before the war they were based and operated in French North Africa. The 
1st BIM also had desert experience, having served previously in Libya and Syria. The 2nd 
Bataillon de Marche had served in Syria while the 1st Bataillon du Pacifique was a new unit. 
Besides the training provided by the British, another method to try to make the French 
conform to British norms was the attachment of a liaison team from the Spears Mission to the 
Brigade. The conflict between British expectations and Free French intentions was to grow 
once the Brigade deployed to the desert with this liaison team, leading to serious 
consequences later as we shall see.  
 
The role of liaison officers 
Liaison officers have, as General Spears pointed out, ‘extremely difficult jobs’.30 In February 
1942, Middle East Command defined the liaison officer’s first two tasks as assisting ‘the Ally 
to whom they are accredited to understand and to comply with the British military system’ 
and ‘to promote understanding and goodwill between the British and the Ally.’31 These were 
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easier said than done. Recalling his time as a Free French staff officer responsible for liaising 
between General de Larminat and Middle East Command, Paul Hucher described a ‘wall of 
incomprehension rising up over the course of a meeting between British generals and my 
French superiors… and I often had the feeling that both sides were counting on me to explain 
to the other what they visibly had not understood or did not want to understand’.32 This 
incomprehension was not simply a question of language but of different ways of 
conceptualising a problem deriving from different systems of education and military training. 
As Hucher pointed out,  
The mental mechanism of an Anglo-Saxon is not the same as that of a French person. 
Most of the problems relating to tactics in the common work comes from ignorance of 
this fact. In order to make our point of view understood to a British person, it is 
necessary to present it to him in the British way, following a process to which he is 
accustomed to… The mistake of the Frenchman is to believe that in reasoning in his way 
he is understood. In general he is not. The Englishman very often seeks to understand 
what we want. He rarely succeeds.33 
The same problem could be seen in reverse: at the defence of Mechilli in January 1942, de 
Larminat commanded the 1st Free French Brigade and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. When 
he explained his plan to General Stanisław Kopański, who had been trained at the French 
Ecole de Guerre, Kopański exclaimed that it was the first time in a year that he received an 
order he easily understood. The problem, de Larminat believed, was not that the British 
command were unclear in their instructions but that “each [nationality] has their own tastes 
and habits. The alphabet can just as easily start at the letter z as at the letter a and what counts 
is the result”.34 Hucher had thoroughly absorbed this fundamental notion to interallied 
cooperation thanks to his previous posting: he had spent over a year in Britain, where he had 
improved his English and experienced the norms and customs of the British army, having 
commanded a Free French battalion within a British corps at Aldershot. One example of the 
cultural differences, which could lead to misunderstandings and serious friction was that, 
according to Hucher, a British soldier considers himself committed once he has given his 
word while for a Frenchman it is when he has signed a document.35 Lieutenant-Colonel R. 
Knox, the chief British liaison officer to the Free French in Cairo, also observed these 
misunderstandings, complaining after a meeting between Free French and British senior 
officers: ‘several people left the meeting with different ideas on the same subject. Of course, 
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it was the usual French case of saying "Yes, but” which means no, but which Englishmen 
think yes means yes.’36 
 
Overcoming this mutual incomprehension took many months of working together to become 
familiar with each other’s ways of thinking and operating. As the Spears Mission quickly 
realised, establishing personal relations between British and French commanders was 
essential to improving interallied understanding, overturning prejudices and building trust. 
Knox complained to his counterpart in London about the Francophobia of senior officers at 
Middle East Command: ‘Every time a new senior officer comes into a post in this 
Headquarters, he has to be carefully educated on Free French matters. Carefully selected 
French officers have to be brought to him either over drinks, over a meal or in business, and 
then he realises that a Frenchman can be a good fellow and a good soldier. You have no 
conception of the prejudice that exists amongst regular soldiers. This prejudice dies quite 
quickly but it always exists to start with.’37 This prejudice seems to have stemmed from the 
rapid collapse of the French army in June 1940 which called into question French fighting 
qualities in the minds of British generals.38 Knox was adept at cultivating these personal 
relationships. For example, in late-1941 he arranged for Koenig to have lunch with the chief 
of the general staff (CGS), General Arthur Smith and other senior officers: ‘This luncheon 
was a little difficult, as CGS’s French is elementary, and Brigadier Temple (Head of GSD) 
and Brigadier Whiteley (DDO), have not a word. Nevertheless, a personal contact was made 
and when these officers meet Gen. Koenig, they always stop and talk for a moment.’39 
Koenig later described Smith as one of the most ‘efficient’ friends of the Free French, an 
impression echoed by General Spears.40 More successful was a dinner Knox organised for 
four Free French officers and five British officers who all spoke French. Colonel Roger 
Peake, a staff officer responsible for operations, ‘sat next to Gen. Koenig and they talked the 
whole evening.’41 The importance of personal relationships was vividly illustrated in the case 
of Colonel Vautrin. He was an experienced French staff officer, who arrived in Cairo in 
February 1943 to become General de Larminat’s new chief of staff. Vautrin had contacts in 
high places in Britain because he had carried out assignments there for the French general 
staff from 1939 to 1940.42 According to Hucher, many doors which had remained closed to 
the Free French (including de Gaulle), opened for Vautrin: he was able to accelerate the 
delivery of 600 vehicles to the 1st Free French Division and secure a commitment from the 
British to use the Division in Tunisia.43 
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The relationships between Free French senior officers and decision-makers in Middle East 
Command were not the only ones that counted. In the field, a British liaison officer attached 
to the 2nd Free French Brigade was urged to make ‘continual personal contacts with the 
officers of British formations… He must then procure the maximum for his Ally, this can 
only be done by personal visits and correspondence should be avoided.’44  Even more 
important still were the relations between the liaison officers themselves and the Free French: 
since all dealings between the Free French and the various headquarters and departments of 
the British army were meant to pass through the Spears Mission, the attitude of its chief 
liaison officer at Middle East Command, Colonel Knox, often determined whether 
cooperation ran smoothly or not. Knox was the son of a bank director from Belfast in the 
north of Ireland. After the outbreak of the First World War, he joined the Royal Irish Rifles 
and served in France, notably spending a year with the French 15 Corps on the frontier with 
Italy. Except for three years as a bank clerk in Northern Ireland following his demobilisation, 
Knox spent the interwar period living in France. He re-joined the British army in 1939 and 
was assigned to the Spears Mission upon its establishment in London in the summer of 1940. 
Knox acted as a liaison officer at the Free French camp at Camberley, before being 
transferred to the Cairo section of the Spears Mission in July 1941.45 Hucher, who knew 
Knox since his time at Camberley, described him in the following terms:  
In his own way he really liked us, really wanted to help us but the problem is that he 
always took himself for the mentor charged with guiding our uncertain steps. In military 
terms, this produces strange results because he is not a career officer (he used to be a 
merchant on the cote d’Azur before the war).46  
Hucher complained that Knox had preconceived ideas about how the Free French forces 
should be organised and equipped which sometimes conflicted with Free French ideas. 
Therefore, the Spears Mission was sometimes a ‘precious help’ and other times a ‘difficult 
obstacle to overcome’ in order to reach the official or the department dealing with a matter 
effecting the Free French.47 From Knox’s perspective, the goal of the Spears Mission was to 
ensure that a well-equipped Free French unit joined Eighth Army and saw action against Axis 
forces, thereby inspiring the resistance in France.48 In his view, this was most likely to 
happen if the French conformed to British concepts of desert warfare. He constantly criticised 
the lack of long-term planning by the Free French command, noting that they were slow to 
realise the necessity of supplying adequate numbers of ancillary troops (artillery crews, 
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wireless operators, drivers, mechanics) and artillery regiments to their formations, and that 
Middle East Command regarded these elements as essential requirements for effective 
frontline units .49 In April 1943 Knox advocated the Free French idea of setting up a group 
headquarters for all their forces fighting with Eighth Army, explaining: ‘It is the lack of such 
a Staff that has been the principal cause of Free French worries and it has been in trying to do 
their work that I have made myself so unpopular in the past two years.’50 While Knox might 
be exaggerating his contribution to Free French staff work, at least two Free French officers 
noted that there forces had lacked experienced staff officers until Colonel Vautrin’s arrival in 
1943.51     
 
The liaison crisis 
The British liaison officer, aside from establishing personal relations and breaking down 
mental barriers between the Allies, was assigned two main tasks by Middle East Command 
which illustrated why the role was a delicate one. He was expected ‘To assist the Ally to 
obtain his requirements’ but also ‘to keep GHQ [General Headquarters] informed of the 
Ally’s progress in training, morale and fitness for war.’52 This meant that on the one hand a 
liaison officer helped the Ally and tried to gain their trust, and on the other hand, he reported 
their activities to his superiors and might even have to directly intervene if the Allied unit 
violated a British regulation. As Middle East Command pointed out, the liaison officer  
will therefore have to exercise the greatest tact and judgement in all his dealings with the 
Ally. He must have the military knowledge to enable him to assist the Ally with advice 
when asked to do so; or on special occasions when he considers it his duty to do so, 
either in the interests of efficiency or on behalf of the British Command. 
 
Since liaison teams were attached to different Allied units, their success in achieving these 
tasks varied considerably. For example, the small size of the Czechoslovakian contingent 
(never numbering more than about 2,000 personnel), meant that the kind of organisational 
and procedural questions that hindered Franco-British cooperation did not arise for the 
Czechoslovakians. Nor is there evidence that they resented being supervised by British 
liaison officers. On the contrary, a Middle East Command censorship summary of soldiers’ 
letters reported that Czechoslovakian writers were delighted that the liaison staff had ensured 
the delivery of special ration scales which enabled them ‘to cook their own national dishes’.53 
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The larger Free French contingent (about 9,000), on the other hand, was recovering from 
France’s humiliating defeat at the hands of Germany, which precipitated the country’s fall 
from major military power to minor ally. They perceived their mission as restoring French 
military honour and maintaining the traditions of the French army.54 Therefore, while General 
de Larminat earnestly wanted the Free French forces under his command to fight with Eighth 
Army, he did not feel obliged to comply with all British procedures, an attitude reinforced by 
de Gaulle’s behaviour towards the British. This created friction with the British liaison staff 
charged with integrating the 1st Free French Brigade into Eighth Army. Only one month after 
the Brigade’s deployment to the desert, Knox was already exasperated by de Larminat’s 
nonchalant attitude towards British regulations: ‘I am sorry to say that the French have been 
breaking all the rules, and rather a row has arisen as a result.’55 He reported three ‘crimes’ by 
the Free French. Firstly, on three occasions they ordered up reinforcements from the Levant 
without informing the headquarters of 13 Corps, Eighth Army or Middle East Command. 
Secondly, de Larminat used a long-range wireless set to communicate with General Catroux 
in Beirut, without authorisation. Finally, de Larminat sent five trucks back to Cairo to buy 
20,000 oranges and fresh vegetables for his troops and asked that the British forward this by 
train in future. This happened during the Cyrenaica offensive in which the British were 
experiencing supply and transport difficulties. The result of these ‘crimes’, according to 
Knox, was that General Smith wrote a personal letter to de Larminat ‘telling him that he 
simply must obey the rules, and remember that he is now a Brigade fighting in the British 
Army, and not somebody’s follies.’56 From de Larminat’s perspective, he was acting 
reasonably under trying circumstances. Firstly, he and others complained about the 
cumbersome British chain of command. For example, to request material and men from Free 
French depots in the Levant, de Larminat was expected to send this request through several 
layers of command – divisional, corps, army and theatre headquarters. Even British Ninth 
Army, based in Palestine and the Levant, had to be consulted since such convoys would pass 
through its jurisdiction.57 The result was unacceptably long delays for receiving 
reinforcements, as far as Free French commanders were concerned. De Larminat tried to 
bypass this logjam by communicating directly with the Free French command in Levant. 
Although it is also worth noting that on occasions Franco-British military cooperation was 
encumbered by the necessity of both sides referring decisions or disagreements back to 
General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Churchill, their respective political leaders in 
London.58 Secondly, de Larminat sent trucks to Cairo to buy vegetables and fruit because he 
received reports that his Equatorial African troops were starting to fall ill owing to the lack of 
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fresh vegetables in British rations.59 It appears that quick action was required in order to 
avoid a serious diminishment of Free French combat effectiveness. 
 
At the same time, the Free French were becoming equally exasperated with Knox for the 
reasons outlined above but also because of an alleged indiscretion on his part. They believed 
he was actively collecting information that showed their forces in a bad light. Two officers 
claim that he wrote a report entitled ‘Iniquities of the French’. De Larminat, who considered 
Knox a ‘spy’, asserts that this report recorded the ‘wickedness and lack of manners’ of the 
Free French, covering everything ‘from murder and rape to holding one’s fork in the right 
hand’.60 Hucher writes that he was shown this ‘unkind’ report and other documents by 
Colonel J. Sherston, the chief liaison officer for all Allied forces in Middle East Command 
and a ‘devout friend’ of the Free French forces.61 Hucher also claims that one of Knox’s 
sources of information were certain Free French officers: in April 1942 he saw a letter on 
Knox’s desk which revealed that an officer named ‘de Guillebon’ had talked to him at length 
about the cadres of the 4th Bataillon de Marche and that de Guillebon would send him a 
report. In fact, this unit was creating difficulties for the Free French: a month previously there 
had been a mutiny, apparently triggered by the soldiers’ desire to be granted leave to visit 
their families in West Africa.62 De Guillebon probably had no choice but to explain the 
situation to Knox and possibly ask for help from the Spears Mission. For his part, Hucher 
believed that Knox’s motive was to justify the Mission’s existence by demonstrating to his 
superiors how well he was able to monitor the Free French.63 Whatever Knox’s motives, his 
report on the ‘Iniquities of the French’ was not conducive to building trust between the two 
allies.  
 
The growing tensions between Free French senior officers and the British liaison staff finally 
erupted into a full-blown crisis in June 1942. Koenig believed that the role of the liaison staff 
was to help the 1st Brigade get used to the British army’s procedures. He informed de 
Larminat that after six months of service the Brigade had completed its ‘apprenticeship’ and 
that the presence of a full liaison staff was no longer justified.64 He was more explicit with 
Major Snead-Cox, the senior liaison officer with the 1st Brigade. According to Snead-Cox, 
Koenig launched into a tirade, accusing the liaison officers of criticising his command. He 
gave the example of a liaison officer intervening when Colonel Amilakvari was about to burn 
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some enemy tanks, advising the latter that a divisional order forbade this. Snead-Cox 
believed the liaison officer was fulfilling his duty as defined by Middle East Command and 
that this could not be considered as a criticism. Koenig disagreed, declaring it had been a 
great mistake that the liaison staff had been brought into existence and that ‘he could not 
continue to accept me [Snead-Cox], because any officer of my seniority would have ideas of 
his own and friction would result.’65 Koenig insisted that for liaison he needed only one very 
junior officer to translate British documents into French. There may have been other motives 
behind Koenig’s outburst. Snead-Cox noted that Koenig had been in a ‘filthy temper’ since 
the 1st Brigade’s difficult evacuation from Bir Hakeim on the night of 10-11 June. Several 
sources state that Koenig lost his nerve in the final days at Bir Hakeim and that during the 
evacuation he reached the British lines in his own vehicle hours before his troops did.66 
Consequently, there was significant discontent within the Brigade and Snead-Cox believed 
Koenig was looking for a scapegoat. While this would explain Koenig’s ‘sudden change of 
attitude’ towards the liaison staff after having previously complimented their work, Koenig – 
if his memoirs are to be believed – had already had the impression of being treated like a 
‘child’ since the training given to his Brigade in January 1942.67 Its seems possible that 
Koenig had been harbouring some resentment against the British liaison system since that 
time which finally exploded after Bir Hakeim. Moreover, there was also trouble in the 2nd 
Free French Brigade and Snead-Cox believed that its commander, General Cazaud, had 
discussed his complaints about liaison with de Larminat, commander of French Forces in the 
Western Desert, who had then passed them onto Koenig. 
 
Knox visited the 2nd Brigade, which was guarding Gambut aerodrome in eastern Libya, on 10 
June after the senior liaison officer, Major Garrick, reported difficulties with the headquarters 
staff. The Brigade’s chief of staff, Major Boisseau, insisted that the liaison staff were purely 
interpreters and that they must, without question, follow the orders of General Cazaud. Knox 
stated that the source of the trouble was that the Free French denied the right of the liaison 
officers to check or query ‘strength returns’ – British army forms on which the Brigade 
declared the number of troops, vehicles and arms it possessed – and demands from the 
Brigade for food rations, ammunition and other supplies. However, the liaison staff had 
orders from Middle East Command to ensure that all demands from the Brigade were 
reasonable and necessary and that strength returns were accurate. The French claimed their 
staff did not need British supervision for this work but past experience had shown serious 
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deficiencies in their record-keeping.68 ‘The truth of the matter,’ Knox concluded, ‘is that the 
French do not like control and prefer to be able to send in whatever figures they like.’69 As to 
Koenig’s assertion that the 1st Brigade no longer needed a full liaison team in order to operate 
effectively under British command, Knox gave three examples from the recent fighting at Bir 
Hakeim where a full liaison staff was essential. Firstly, the 1st Brigade was attached to the 
British 7th Armoured Division and the latter demanded a liaison officer contact the Division 
by telephone at least once every half hour with a situation report. This was needed 24 hours a 
day requiring two liaison officers for the work. Secondly, the headquarters of 7th Division, 30 
Corps and Eighth Army stated that they would not receive Free French officers who were not 
accompanied by a liaison officer. Finally, one liaison officer was always with French patrols 
to be the link with the British armoured car unit which was acting as a reconnaissance screen 
for the French and gave their reports in English. Knox urged his superiors that  
the time has come when the duties of liaison in the field should be laid down in 
unmistakeable terms and the French informed that the liaison staff is not there entirely 
for their benefit but to assist the Commander under whose orders they come.70 
 
The attitude adopted by both brigades towards their liaison staff made cooperation impossible 
and required arbitration by Middle East Command to avoid a total breakdown of the liaison 
system. General Spears advocated a hard-line:  the French should be made to realise that it is 
a ‘great privilege’ to collaborate with Britain and that other allies would desperately like to 
receive the equipment that Britain has given to the Free French. The precondition for this 
‘privileged’ collaboration is that the French ‘agree to conform to our military system. Those 
who do not accept this must understand that they are not wanted.’71 He suggested that the 
liaison officers be withdrawn because the Free French had badly treated them and then the 
brigades be withdrawn from Eighth Army until the French reversed their position. Middle 
East Command opted for a more tactful solution. The brigades did withdraw from Eighth 
Army but this was to rest, train and refit rather than a punishment. Indeed, Eighth Army 
invited de Larminat to form a Free French mobile battle group to participate in future 
operations, ‘in recognition of the excellent work done by 1st Free French Group at Bir 
Hakeim’.72 The Liaison staff stayed in their posts although personnel changes occurred on 
both sides. In the 2nd Brigade, the Free French replaced General Cazaud and his chief-of-staff 
Major Boisseau with Lieutenant-Colonel Eugène Alessandri and Major Georges Baviere 
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respectively, who were considered more inclined to work smoothly with the British.73 The 
Spears Mission removed three liaison officers in July and another three in August. Among 
them was Captain Dunnolly – previously described by de Larminat to Knox as ‘an excellent 
officer but who had a filthy character and temper’ – and Major Snead-Cox.74 Knox admitted 
that both these officers were ‘frequently tactless’.75 In July Knox reported that liaison was 
working much better and that the changing of certain officers on both sides had assisted this. 
He also credited Colonel Sherston, who was well-regarded by the Free French, for his frank 
discussion with Koenig and de Larminat about their grievances.76 It appears that Middle East 
Command firmly insisted that the French cooperate with the liaison staff in carrying out their 
duties for the British commander while at the same time reminding the liaison officers of the 
need for tact in their interactions with French officers.  
 
The learning curve 
In the aftermath of the liaison crisis both sides modified their approach to integration. For 
their part, the Free French softened their resistance to the British army’s concepts and 
methods. For example, when their command decided in July 1942 to form a division, it 
decided to follow the British model. Hucher observed that  
de Larminat and Koenig had at last understood that in order to fight within the 
framework of a foreign army, the best is to adopt its organisation pure and simple, which 
does not exclude certain adjustments, where we can do better on certain points.77  
While on the British side we see clear change in the revised orders issued to British military 
missions in September 1942. Still present was the requirement that Allied units comply with 
the British military system, but gone was the liaison officer’s responsibility to give, on 
special occasions, unsolicited advice to the Ally ‘in the interests of efficiency or on behalf of 
the British Command’ – ‘advice’ which Koenig had perceived as criticism of his command. 
He was not alone. Evidence from censorship summaries of soldiers’ letters suggests that 
while Polish, Czechoslovakian and Yugoslav units had good relations with their British hosts, 
frustration with the British liaison system existed within the 1st Greek Brigade. In September 
1942, a British NCO with the liaison staff attached to this unit wrote: ‘Whether the Greeks 
eventually go into action remains to be seen, but I hope to hell we are not with them. It has 
got to a stage now that they think they can do without a Mission’.78 The Brigade had been 
under British command for over a year without seeing action and other censorship summaries 
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indicate that while morale was high, the troops were impatient to fight the German army in 
Libya.79 Similar to the Free French situation, the behaviour of some liaison officers seems to 
have given Greek officers the impression of being tutored, which was naturally frustrating for 
the Allies, particularly if a liaison officer intervened with ‘advice’ after an Allied officer had 
given an order, thereby undermining his authority in front of the troops. To avoid this 
antagonism the new orders to liaison officers declared:  
It is impossible for harmony to exist if British officers are critical of Allied methods. If 
any action by the Ally appears to be irregular or not in accordance with British orders, 
the British officer concerned will NOT point this out to the Ally but will bring it to the 
notice of the OC section of the BMM under whom he is serving.80 
This officer will normally bring the irregularity to the attention of the headquarters of the 
British formation in which the Allied unit is serving and it is the formation commander’s 
responsibility to deal with the matter. In a further bid to preserve the integrity of the liaison 
system, Major-General Harding, Deputy Chief of Staff at Middle East Command, wrote a 
letter to British formation commanders confirming that the liaison officer was at the 
commander’s disposal to inform him about the quality of the Allied unit ‘but such 
weaknesses as he may disclose should not be repeated to any Ally as having been reported by 
the British liaison staff.’81  
 
The practical effect of the revised orders was evident in the report for October 1942 of the 
senior liaison officer attached to the 2nd Free French Brigade. Major Garrick recounted that 
on several occasions the Brigade commander, Colonel Alessandri, had disobeyed orders from 
the commander of British 50th Division. The latter thought that it was the senior liaison 
officer’s duty to see that the Division’s orders were carried out, but Garrick explained to him 
that in fact his responsibility was to ensure that the orders were properly understood by 
Alessandri ‘and that he [Garrick] should not attempt to influence any decision by the Brigade 
Commander’. Yet the 50th Division commander continued to issue rebukes to Garrick when 
his orders were disobeyed by Alessandri and he expected Garrick to pass them on verbally to 
Alessandri. Garrick complained: ‘This is a thing which no L.O. [liaison officer] with an 
Allied formation should be asked to do as it prejudices his standing in the eyes of the Ally.’ 
He wrote that serious admonishments must be sent in a signed letter by the commander to 
Alessandri or if this is not possible the commander or a senior staff officer must come to the 
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Brigade headquarters and issue the rebuke personally, with perhaps the liaison officer acting 
as interpreter. Nonetheless, Garrick felt obliged to pass on several rebukes ‘as tactfully as 
possible’. He concluded that the source of the problem was cultural: ‘Were the Brigade 
Commander British, the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] would have no hesitation in 
administering the rebuke himself, and in my opinion it is the innate shyness and 
embarrassment of an Englishman when confronted by a “foreigner” that prevents him 
speaking his mind.’82 In spite of the learning curve, Franco-British military relations were 
still sometimes bedevilled by cultural differences.  
 
The other role of the Spears Mission: the provision of training and equipment 
Writing during the liaison crisis, Knox explained that he was not surprised that the dispute 
followed French success at Bir Hakeim:  
The French fully realise that they are the little heroes in the eyes of the British army at 
the present moment and they will not be slow to seize the opportunity to gain advantage 
for themselves, though this is a short-sighted policy as they little know how little they 
would have got without the Mission to assist them.83 
So what had the Spears Mission done for the Free French? Since autumn 1941 the Mission 
had been concentrating its assistance in two main areas: training and equipment. There was a 
view in the Free French forces that the only job of the Spears Mission was to obtain material 
for them.84 However, aside from providing day-to-day operational liaison between the Free 
French brigades and British headquarters and neighbouring units (a significant task in itself), 
the Spears Mission worked hard to address French deficiencies in training. They liaised with 
the relevant British departments to organise training for the Free French tank company and 
reconnaissance unit. They identified a shortage of wireless operators in the French brigades 
and they planned to set up a small Free French signals school under British supervision so 
that the Free French could learn British methods. This was essential if the Free French were 
to operate efficiently within British formations. Despite Koenig’s initial resistance they 
succeeded in sending 40 soldiers to be trained by British signals officers in August 1942 and 
another 40 were trained in September.85 In fulfilling its training Mission, the liaison staff was 
often frustrated with the Free French command’s attitude to specialist training courses. In 
Knox’s opinion, they viewed them as useful for officers during periods of inactivity but that 
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they should not ‘interfere with any other type of work’, resulting regularly in no officers 
being sent on courses or officers being withdrawn just before the start date.86  
 
Turning to equipment, the Free French were continuously frustrated with the long delays in 
receiving material from the British, especially all-terrain vehicles which were needed to give 
their units mobility in the desert. For example, by late-1941 the 1st Brigade had received 200 
vehicles but the 2nd Brigade was unable to join Eighth Army for months due to the difficulty 
of obtaining vehicles. Knox was keenly aware of this problem and lobbied hard on behalf of 
the Free French, urging Middle East Command to at least issue a training scale of various 
weapons if full allocations could not be made, as ‘the fact remains that we as a nation did ask 
these people to come and fight, and we are under a moral obligation to give them the where-
with-all to fight.’87 There was, as Hucher pointed out, a series of factors beyond the Mission’s 
control which created an equipment shortage throughout Eighth Army: the abnormal wear 
and tear of vehicles in desert conditions, the inability of the repair workshops (despite an 
enormous effort) to satisfy the Army’s needs and the fact that the convoys bringing new 
material from the United States took six months to arrive in Egypt. The result was that the 
British army could not even meet its own needs for equipment, which meant the Free French 
were very far down the list of priorities.88 Finally, from April 1942 onwards the trickle 
became a flow: the 2nd Brigade received 110 trucks and deployed to Libya, the tank company 
was issued nine tanks and the reconnaissance unit obtained 48 armoured cars. Unfortunately, 
in June the 1st Brigade lost 250 vehicles and 40 75mm cannons at Bir Hakeim and needed to 
be completely re-equipped by the British. However, according to Hucher, the Free French 
had obtained an advantage: ‘Eighth Army now counted us among its best units’.89 Certainly, 
Knox reported the positive impression the Free French defence of Bir Hakeim had left on 
senior British officers, including the new Eighth Army commander, General Bernard 
Montgomery, who requested the 1st Brigade for his upcoming offensive.90 By October, the 1st 
and 2nd Brigades had been fully equipped and re-joined Eighth Army. 
 
Conclusion 
Though the British considered the Free French a minor ally, in comparison with Britain’s 
other European allies they certainly had a more important status. In the Middle East in mid-
1942, the British-led coalition included 1,607 Czechoslovakians, 1,906 Yugoslavians, 4,720 
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Poles and 12,191 Greeks91 (joined a year later by 8,543 Belgian Congolese92). The Free 
French, in contrast, had 8,945 personnel serving with the British in Libya and Egypt, 23,483 
regular and auxiliary troops protecting the Levant in case of a German descent from the 
Caucasus in southern Russia and their own territory in Africa, the Levant, India and the 
Pacific which ensured a supply of new recruits.93 This gave the Gaullists some leverage with 
the British and explains why they were in no rush to abandon French army norms in favour of 
British ones: they saw themselves as an important ally fighting together with – and not 
assimilating into – the British army. The other allies, with less troops and no territory, had 
little choice but to conform to the British military system. Even when the Poles were able to 
form a corps of 50,000 men, thanks to Russia evacuating former prisoners-of-war to the 
Middle East, their total dependence on Britain constrained them to follow British 
organisation and doctrine.94 Similarly, the Free French complained about the delay in 
receiving equipment from the British but the Greeks had an even lower priority, which is why 
they waited in frustration for over a year, before finally joining 8th Army at the battle of El 
Alamein.  
 
The impressive integration of the 1st Free French Brigade into the British forces defending the 
Gazala line, that Tomkins had observed in May 1942, was not achieved without cost. It is 
clear that the previous six months of Free French participation in Eighth Army had been 
challenging but also a formative learning experience for both sides that led to changes in their 
respective approaches to integration. For their part, the Free French softened their resistance 
to the British army’s concepts, acknowledging that a precondition for operating efficiently 
within a foreign army was to follow its principles of organisation. While on the British side 
flaws in their conduct of interallied liaison were addressed. The Spears Mission was 
indisputably right to devote much effort to cultivating personal relations between British and 
French commanders. Considering the ill-feeling created by the failed Allied campaign in 
France in 1940, this was essential to improving interallied understanding, overturning 
prejudices and building trust.95 The problem lied in the contradiction between the liaison 
officers’ orders to, on the one hand, help the Ally and gain their trust, and on the other hand, 
to directly intervene if the Allied unit violated a British regulation. This risked placing the 
liaison officer in the patronising role of ‘babysitter’, causing resentment among the Allied 
officers and imperilling the goodwill built up between the liaison team and the Ally. We see a 
changed attitude in the revised orders issued to British military missions in September 1942, 
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where Middle East Command acknowledged the limits to integration and the need to respect 
the Allied commander’s executive authority over his unit. In spite of the learning curve, 
Franco-British military cooperation was still sometimes bedevilled by cultural differences. 
However, for the most part the Spears Mission succeeded in ensuring effective operational 
liaison between the Free French and British forces and in responding to French training 
needs.  Ultimately, this experience of fighting a coalition war in the desert was important for 
the Allied war effort. The lessons that were learnt here helped the Allies when they launched 
larger multinational operations in Italy and northwest Europe. 
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